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INTRODUCTION 
jority of the papers submitted for SMD were of a h 
as were the presentations. It is invidious to pick out 
The ma igh quality, 
only five, 
,.*.I, 
* 
* 
$  1  
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, . ;  
i 
‘..). 
* I  . ,  c.1 
but I felt that those which have been included in this sample, particularly 
deserved a wider circulation than just me. There are many others of 
similar quality, but some of those were too long, too specialised, 
confidential or plain illegible. 
Many thanks nevertheless to all of you. 
Malcolm Harper 
BAND AID - HOW TO MAKE STARVATION SEXY 
BY 
JONATHAN FORREST 
"What we've done is made starvation sexy." 
"It's like a large part of the world's closet softies - people 
waiting to be pushed into giving - have woken up. We have to keep 
them awake." 
Kevin Jenden, director of the Band Aid Trust. 
"Band Aid's real importance.... 
certainly useful. 
is not the money, although it is 
What counts is the publicitv and whether this 
can be translated into sustained nolitical sunnort for more 
and a better north-south economic relationship.H aid 
Caroline Moorehead, New Society. 
PART 1 - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND TO TRR RAND AID BUSINESS. 
The Band Aid bandwagon has attracted media attention the world 
over; attention 
the worldtt 
focussed both on the Band Aid message to "feed 
and on the remarkable success that the 
has had in swelling the ranks of those who organisation ' 
seeks This paper to review the awakening of the 'closet zi;$esl 
beginnings of a and the worldwide **** Aid movement (insert 
noun: Bard Aid, Visual Aid, 
have been used already). 
Live Aid and Sport Aid, o~"~&r~~ 
It concludes with observations on th; 
future for the movement and on whether it is likely to have any 
lasting effect. 
Before discussing 'the movement though it is necessary to 
establish its relevance to the subject of aid/development. 
The phenomenon has been one of a heightened national philanthropism toward a particular cause. What was it about the 
Band Aid message or events that triggered this response? As Band 
Aid has proven that 'starvation can be sexy I 
lessons here for other charities to learn? are there any Once the Band Aid 
organisation has come to an end, 
at increased levels? 
will the nation carry on giving 
Or was Band Aid a cause that found its time 
but that cannot be repeated? 
the message, the media 
Finally, how was it that the idea, 
and the success combined in such an effective manner? . 
BACKGROUND 
"1 simply had an idea, went for it and it worked.'* - Bob Geldof. 
The Band Aid cause was inspired in one man by a television news 
report by Michael Buerkt a report now famed in history as a 
testament to the persuading power of that particular medium. The outcome was a Christmas record in 1984 that raised f8m. As a fund 
raising initiative a record had not been tried before, at least 
not on such a scale. To existing charities, 
channel had never been open; 
such a promotional 
it needed the contacts and hard 
work of an established, if jaded, 
possible. 
'pop' celebrity to make it 
Geldof was needed as 'champion' of the cause, a role he almost 
passively assumed as the movement gathered momentum around him. 
In the general public's eye though, it looked very much as if 
Geldof and Giving were becoming synonymous. Geldof's direct views 
were no doubt entirely natural for him, but the result of his 
blunt outbursts was alwaysemore money for the cause. Geldof 
became inextricably associated with the paradoxical 'glamour' of 
the plight of the starving. In June 1985 Geldof commented, t*Itts 
pathetic that the price of a life is a plastic record. 
that's the way it has to be , 
BYt if 
you have to use glamour.*' The 
glamour of the pop world rubbed off on the cause: 'stars' sang 
and the pop promotion professionals marketed the image. 
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The press began to speak of Geldof in terms more appropriate $0 a 
missionary, even his crltzcs talked of his ttmissionary zeal". In 
his reported press comments Geldof frequently recounts how the 
cause would overtake him. 
receiving 
Talking of an emotional outburst when 
a pop award he says, "1 didn't plan to spout off.... but when I began thinking about the Qtarving millions that needed 
help, I felt such despairing rage." . ..and all this before fevered emotion of the Live Aid concert in July '85. the 
Since then, of course, we have seen Sport Aid, Geldof announce his retirement from the aid ,business and most recently his 
honorary knighthood. 
THE GIVERS 
Question: were the public responding to a cult hero, or to the needs of a distant and drought stricken nation? 
Despite the media attention paid to the Band Aid promotion, 
little comment is available that either analyses Band Aid donors 
or their reasons for giving. The issues underlying these reasons 
are complex, though no-where have I found any typology of what 
they might be. Newspaper commentators have made 
falling into the following categories; suggestions 
*Guilt3 -as a response to screened Pictures of the starving while we have food-to eat. 
*Anger - 
*Fashion- 
as an citizen of a once imperial power that once 'exploited' the famine stricken region. 
with an economic and political system that is 
seemingly slow to act and can make the 
individual feel impotent when confronted with 
the famine pictures on the television.. The 
mass giving became a personal statement made 
to a people suffering a personal tragedy (as the television has presented it) and in spite 
of a government that seems impersonal and 
unwilling to express humanitarian concern. 
the tlenuningl syndrome, 
group behaviour. 
of following peer 
*Altruism-newly stirred though 
selfless passion 
previously latent 
for the welfare of others. 
The motives for giving may be thought of as immaterial, in that it is money, not motives, that buys food and trucks. From the 
point of view of the fund raiser, though, if the reasons WhY people give in such huge amounts could be fathomed there could be 
great rewards in designing future fund raising strategies. 
It is likely that the reasons why the Band Aid events have led to 
i?ve at 
much giving are quite different from the reasons that people 
other times. It is also clear that the type of person 
giving is quite different in each case. 
Established charities such as Oxfam have traditionally relied on 
the middle class, middle aged, 
middle of the road. 
middle income and politically 
Band Aid's donors can almost be defined as 
every-one not in these categories.The concert found a wide 
appeal; from schoolchildren through to millionaires with pennies 
and fortunes to give respectively. 
For the most part though, the Band Aid donor was typically 
younger, possibly making a first contribution to charities 
outside of the fund raising. events commonly found in schools. 
Clearly the 'POP' image of the various events 
appeal 
found popular 
among the audience that had always been loyal to that 
particular genre. 
capitalise 
The breakthrough was in being able to 
on those who had outgrown the pop music culture 
who 
(but 
were eager to sentimentalise) while at the same time 
satisfying the current pop consumers. With music generally 
dating back not more than fifteen years or so, the composition of 
the targetted donor market was defined,(ie. up to about 40 
years). 
There were fears at the time that such substantial giving would 
divert funds from other charities not connected with the African 
famine. These proved wrong, both because established donors 
remained loyal to their particular charities, and because to a 
large extent the Band Aid promotion was not targetted on them. 
Indeed for them, giving for Africa seemed to become 'extra' 
giving, in addition to other giving. After initial concern, the 
larger charities actually found that their receipts for the year 
were higher than expected. 
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PART 2 - THE BAND AID PLATFORM - HOW THE APPEAL WAS MADE. 
"It is important to make a grand gesture....10 - 1 Bob Geldof 
TEE MEDIA 
Despite Geldof's antipathy toward the press, 
photographed holding stanring children, 
his refusal to be 
it is true that it was 
the use of the media that made Band Aid possible. 
Times, not alone amongst the newspapers, 
The Sunday 
concert the I*... greatest 
excitedly dubbfd the 
journalese 
rock extravaganza ever" In 
it was to involve hundreds of thousands in stadia all 
over the world, to raise hundreds of millions and to be watched 
by thousands of millions. 
Times 
The event, according to 
was to be staged for the most part at cost, 
the Sunday 
and soon pop 
stars and record companies were vying with each other to give the 
most royalties 
released records. 
and margins away on specially recorded or re- 
P.R. 
Though cynics in the press pointed out the good 
that this brought for the music business, 
find suggestion 
no-where can I 
performers. 
that this was the primary motivation of the 
Perhaps the most celebrated (at the time) critic of the event wag 
Terry Coleman, 
The message he 
writing in the Guardian on the Monday following. 
whether 
gives is essentially negative in questioning 
crooks 
the money will do any more than be embezzled by local 
in the field. The point of Live Aid, by the 
charity is in overcoming this feeling of pointlei&lzP in 
trying to help. 
even 
A worker is reported as saying, "Band Aid has to 
be seen to succeed, 
be turned off again, 
to spend the money well...or the 
and go back to their 'every-one's 
young will 
so why bother?'lt. 
corrupt, 
The message is that in order to encourage giving the charity must 
make the donor feel that he/she is being effective in overcoming 
deprivation. 
set 
To achieve this the public needs to be sold a simple 
of solutions; 
whatever they do 
they become demotivated if they perceive that 
concentrated 
the problem will persist. Thus the appeal 
largely on the message "feed the worldtt, featuring 
film reports showing the relief camps. The message was almost,l@by 
giving money you will be putting food into these mouthst9. 
The problem of how this food was to be transported to the 
was not one that the public would understand. 
camps 
In conseguence, 
they would be less likely to respond to appeals for money for 
lorries. 
glamorous, 
A Christian Aid worker commented “Lorries are not very 
people 
starving children". 
vould rather give money to give food to 
Moreover what is true of the general public 
is also true of the United Nations. A U.N. official is reported 
saying 
i:oblem 
ttWe could bury Africa five feet 
at all... 
deep in food; no 
the hungry peopletV. 
6but you try getting the money to shift it to 
THE ORGANISATION 
In making disaster relief 'sexy' 
columns 
Band Aid also opened the press 
to journalists who found news in describing the 
distribution of aid. As the Band Aid appeal became more 
successful, fewer critics questioned the energy of the Band Aid 
staff, it was their ability and inexperience that was remarked 
upon. After all how could inexperienced workers be trusted to 
administer professionally the largest donor initiative in the 
history of famine relief? 
For all their inexperience though the Band Aid workers made few 
rudimentary errors. Paul Vallely, 
allies in the press, 
one of Band Aid's principal 
has provided an argument to suggest how this 
crew of naive do-gooders proved so effective. .: . . 
First, Geldof created "an atmosphere of brutal naivety 
which enabled him to ask the questions no one else dared 
put to the Ethiopian socialists." The press even coined 
a new term for Geldof's style; punk diplomacy. 
Second, Band Aid developed a strategy of working through 
existing and experienced aid organisations such as Oxfam 
Save the Children and Unicef. And lest this should seem 
an obvious tactic, Vallely contrasts this common sense 
with the Maxwell's blunder when the 
Flight' 
'Mirror Mercy 
deluged Rorem camp with tons of chocolate 
Horlicks... something the Ethiopian peasants would not 
touch. 
Third, because Band Aid are not a bureaucracy they are 
able to act speedily. One such example is the purchase 
of a fleet of second hand lorries that were standing 
idle, but that were not being taken up by the other 
agencies for no reason other than their internal 
policies. 
Fourth, with the weight of substantial funds behind 
*them, Band Aid chartered out space on a shipping shuttle 
that they ran to the Red Sea ports so that other 
agencies could ship supplies more rapidly, (ie.without 
having to give the long notice required by commercial 
shipping lines). 
Fifth, despite the need to court the press and return 
headline stealing pictures and stories to the West, 
Geldof avoided any display of what could have been 
interpreted as hypocrisy; he would not be photographed 
with the dying merely for the sake of the cameras but 
instead spoke continually of the need to restore dignity 
to the people. He stuck to his messaae. In apparently 
not caring whom he spoke it to, from Margaret Thatcher 
to the leaders of the African states, he won the respect 
of the giving public in the U.K. They were ready to 
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support his condemnation of bureaucracies that tend to 
find reasons for not saving lives, rather than ways of overcoming apparently insurmountable obstacles. There is 
evidence in this that Geldof's cause had happened upon its time, in as much as his reactions seemed spontaneous 
and he apparently only reflected a wider indignation 
held by the general public. 
PART 3 - WHAT RAS'BAND AID ACHIEVED? 
There is no doubt that the primary reason that Band Aid started 
up was as a humanitarian response to the unacceptable face of 
suffering presented on the television screen. The success of the 
venture depended on the wider public being presented with the 
famine disaster in an almost brutal fashion, to offend any sense 
of uncaring that they might have had and to shame them into not 
tolerating starvation. The vehicle happened to be the music 
industry: an industry where commercial success is built on the 
ability to 'move' a public. 
In the end though, despite the fact that Band Aid raised up to 
flOOm for the famine relief, the movement was more about raising 
a political.consciousness among the public for this issue. Though 
it will buy a lot of biscuits for she hungry, the problems of the 
famine region and indeed the Third World as a whole will not be 
met by the altruism of a general,public in the West, 
through an occasional charity kick. 
expressed 
A number of writers in the press have lain the responsibility for 
sorting out the economic problems of the poor world at the door 
of the Western leaders. In a painful article in the Sunday Times 
last July, various writers highlighted the true scale of the 
Ethiopian disaster by charting the failure of political will that 
prevented the use of satellite technology already installed to 
warn of the impending drought. Itls.message is that we possess 
the technolggy to bring environmental stability to hostile 
environments . This is surely a start in that it provides some 
sort of security to peoples who otherwise can be catastrophically 
displaced by drought. 
But is there the will on the part of the Western governments to 
see Ethiopia developed? Certainly the Band Aid movement brought 
into focus the Thatcher government's policy on aid to peoples in 
Marxist-Leninist controlled states. Despite the drought Thatcher 
held out for no more than emergency relief for the starving, 
ignoring the need for longer term aid despite the injunctions of 
Oxfam amongst others. 
All the agencies have emphasised the need for investment in soil 
and water conservation, re-planting of forests and agriculture if 
further famines are to be avoided in subsequent years. The 
government, as it's answer for the longer term, is content to 
train a few Ethiopian agronomists (provided the Swedes pay!). As 
far as policy on development is concerned the Reagan-Thatcherite 
thinking is that in the world market the benefits of a healthy 
'Western economy will 'trickle down' to the Third World. The 
problem is that where the core world economies are themselves in 
trouble, the peripheral weak economies of poor countries are 
bound to suffer. In the case of countries like Ethiopia that 
suffering is compounded by the political trade and development 
barriers that exist between the West and socialist countries. 
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Furthermore I have yet to see a convincing argument or example of 
where or how this 'trickle down' has actually occured, 
pro-western LDC. even for a 
Aid is 
insular 
still not good political 
British 
ammunition though. 
character the ramifications of 
In true 
differing politico-economic philosophies are only the basis of intense 
debate where the home economy is being 
politicking has only recently been able t?%~al~E~r'nuclear Party 
disarmament to election issue status. 
likely to 
The public are hardly 
respond to political parties on the basis of their 
espoused policies toward aid. 
This said, Band Aid have at least put the aid 
political agenda. 
issue 
It is interesting that the U.N. 
on the 
Africa 
session on 
recently felt a considerable pressure to come up 
substantial 
with a 
statement, and were not. content .to 'let the 
opportunity slip by them for want of a little po,l+tical energy. 
In one of the opening quotations Caroline Moorehead asks whether 
Band Aid has created the political will for improved North-South 
economic relations. 
caveats 
The answer must be a qualified yes. The 
are t 
that the issue is still only an agenda item, it is still 
playing second fiddle,to military strategic diplomacy. 
that aid may not be sustainable as a world political 
issue and may in consequence drop off the agenda. 
that in the U.K., 
find mileage 
because no political party can easily 
in espousing the 'people come first' aid 
approach that Band Aid has typified, 
quietly die off. 
the issue will 
Band Aid Appeal, 
Without the continued haranging of the 
the public will not focus on the cause. 
On the face of it this may seem a depressing prognosis. The 
energy of a unique movement being dissipated against a monolith 
of international economic and political diplomacy on the one hand 
and the apparently intractable problems of a famine struck region 
on the other. But it is exactly this tendency toward resigned 
despair that Band Aid so decisively sought to combat. Geldof's 
message was that something can be done to combat suffering and no 
doubt many owe their lives today to his vision. What is needed 
now is not a pop star with a maniacal mission but a 
and a powerful one at that if the international 
politician, 
complexion of the aid business is to be changed. 
political 
REFERENCES 
l- 
2 - 
Sunday Times 16-06-85 'IGlobal Juke BoxIt Justine 
Dorothy Wade and Mark Hosenball. 
Picardie, 
Guardian 15-07-85 llMissionary Zeal in a World of Famine" 
Terry Coleman. 
3 - 
4 - 
See also Guardian 26-07-85 "More to show than agony of the 
hungry" Michael Simmons. 
New Society 18-10-85 ttGeldof .and the giversI* Caroline 
Moorehead. 
5 - Sunday Times 21-07-85 ItQuestions that won't go awayIt Chris 
Curtain and others. 
6 - Observer 14-07-85 "Live Aid is not enoughtt Geoffrey Lean 
See also, 
- Times 24-07-85 ttBureaucrats, take note" Paul Vallely 
- Times 22-10-85 "Bob rocks the boat in Africa" Paul Vallely 
- Guardian 16-07-85 nDevelopment as illusionI' and ."Trying to 
stop the famines of tomorrowI* Walter Schwarz and Jonathan 
Steele. . 
- Times 25-10-85 "Famine: keep the basic balancetfi Paul Vallely 
- Guardian 06-12-85 "Aid ko$ak but what tomorrow?tt Farouk El- 
Baz. 
- Guardian 15-07-85 ItWe are the first world, you are the third 
world'@ Mark Lewis . 
10 
SETTLEMENT PROJECTS AS A SOLUTION TO 
LANDLESSNESS AND URBAN DRIFT IN KENYA 
BY 
KEITH HOWELLS 
1. Introduction 
2. Background 
3. Problems 
3.1 Conceptual and Economic Problems 
3.2 Technical Problems 
3.3 Institutional and Management Problems 
4. Settlement as a Solution to Landlessness and 
Urban Drift 
5; Alternatives to Settlement 
6. Conclusions 
Appendix A 
Appendix B 
Page 
1 
2 
8 
10 
12 
References 
. Introduction 
The population 
about 4% per annum, 
of Kenya has been growing 
rural growth (2.8%). 
with urban growth (8%) 
rapidly at 
fast outstripping 
Growth has put pressure on the 20% of the 
land which is considered suitable for rain-fed agriculture, 
has resulted in increasing landlessness. 
and 
With urban unemployment at 30% and 
providing 65% of Xenya's foreign exchange earnings, 
agriculture 
settlement 
agricultural 
the problems 
projects would seem to offer a plausible solution to 
development 
of landlessness and urban drift. This paper uses the 
of the Bura Irrigation and Settlement Project as an 
example to examine the feasibility of such solutions. 
The objectives 
landlessness 
of the project were to 
in the overpopulated agricultural 
relieve 
zones, 
employment and increase output of cotton for export. 
provide 
was largely aid financed, with the predominant 
The project 
multilateral 
lenders being the IBRD, the IDA and the EDF. Bilateral finance in 
the form of grants and soft loans was provided by Britain, 
Finland, Holland and Japan. 
The project 
settlement 
has been described as the most expensive 
scheme in the world, 
family settled. 
at a cost of about $40,000 per 
full, and is 
The project has failed to meet its objectives in 
likely to require operating subsidies for the 
forseeable future. 
Section 2 of the paper gives a brief background to the 
Bura project and Section 3 outlines some of the particular 
problems which have caused the project to underperform. Section 4 
discusses whether the project is replicable and whether this type 
of development presents a viable solution to landlessness and 
urban drift in Kenya. Section 5 looks at some of the alternative 
solutions and Section 6 draws some conclusions. 
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2. Backaround 
The project is located on the West bank of the Tana 
River about 200 ksa from the coast. The area is semi-arid and 
sparsely populated, mainly supporting pastoral nomads. A few 
people practice subsistance agriculture on the river flood 
plains. Infrastructure is poorly developed and access is 
difficult. 
About 80% of Kenya is arid or semi-arid and requires 
irrigation to produce viable crop returns. The population has 
been growing rapidly and placing increasing pressure on land in 
the traditionally rain-fed agricultural areas. Settlement of 
semi-arid areas through promotion of irrigation has been seen as 
a solution to the growing incidence of landlessness and the 
resulting tendency for people to drift to the towns. 
The main objectives of the Bura project were thus seen 
as settling landless people, providing them with worthwhile 
employment and increasing agricultural output. Settlers were to 
be selected from each of Kenya's Provinces on a quota basis. 
The aim was to settle 5200 families in 23 villages 
and the population was expected t0 reach 65,000 in time. 
Infrastructure .in the form of roads, treated water supplies, 
sewerage, schools, clinics, etc. was to be provided to accomodate 
this population. 
Each settler family was to be provided with a house, a 
vegetable plot and 1.25 ha. of land on which they were required 
to grow cotton and maize. Cotton was to be the major cash crop, 
with maize grown for subsistance and local resale. Services such 
as land preparation, crop protection, provision of water, seed 
and fertilizer, etc. were to be provided by the scheme 
authorities and charges deducted from the proceeds from the sale 
of cotton. Cotton was to be ginned on site and sold for export, 
despite Kenya being a net importer, since its superior quality 
was expected to attract a price premium (and was in any case too 
high for local spinners). 
project 
protect 
Irrigated fuelwood plantations were included in the 
plan to provide fuel for the settled population and to 
the riverine forest strip, (which is considered fo be 
biologically unique), from destruction. 
The executing agency was the National Irrigation Board, 
a parastatal body. Construction started in 1979 and the first 
settlers moved in in 1981. However, about that time the project 
began to run into financial difficulties. Inflation, devaluation, 
underestimations and unforeseen expenditures led to rapidly 
rising costs. With a fixed aid package, Kenya's share of the 
costs rose from XSh.160m (20%) in 1977 to XSh.lOOOm (45%) by 1982 
as the project cost soared from XSh.800m to XSh.2200m in the same 
period. 
2 
At the same time, Kenya's ability to pay for such projects was being undermined by declining world commodity prices 
in the face of recession, and the influence of' the IMF on 
development expenditure policy. The Government was unable to meet 
its obligations on many contracts which led to substantial delays 
and costly claims for damages. 
In 1983, 
the project 
a decision was made to curtail the scope of 
by about half, reducing the number of settler 
families to 2500 and the cost to XSh.1500m. This was despite the 
fact that irrigation and water treatment works had already been 
substantially completed for the full population, the main 
outstanding works being houses, schools and the fuelwood 
plantations. The aid agencies were asked and agreed to provide 
100% financing for the remaining construction to ease the cash 
flow problems. 
As well as the severe financial problems, the project 
suffered from conceptual, technical and institutional 
deficiencies which are described in the following Section. 
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3. Problems 
3.1 Conceotual and Economic Problems 
(al Settlement Issues 
The concept of settling people from all over Xenya on a 
quota basis is dubious. Settlers from the Kenya highlands, where 
the pressure on land is the greatest, are unused to the 
inhospitable climate and lack resistance to the endemic diseases 
such as malaria and bilharzia. Desertion and death rates amongst 
settlers have been high and many household heads have chosen to 
leave their families at home. The result has been that the 
settlement objectives and the relief of pressure on the land have 
not been met. In addition, the settler is unable to manage the 
holding singlehanded and production has consequently suffered. 
Many of the settlers see the project as providing' temporary . . 
employment only, and intend to return home if they can save 
enough to buy land there. 
In contrast, 'settlers' from the local Coast Province 
who are more used to the climate and have more resistance to the 
endemic diseases have adapted well to the Scheme, and are farming 
reasonably successfully. 
Thus the project as a solution to landlessness and 
urban drift may have been misconceived from the outset. 
_(bl Incentives for Production 
Ownership of land is an important issue in Kenya, yet 
settlers are given land on one year renewable leases. This leads 
to a sense of insecurity and destroys any incentive for the 
tenant to develop the land or settle permanently. The rational 
behind leasing is to ensure that the authorities retain control. 
The provision of all inputs (seed, fertilizer, etc.) by 
the authorities and the authoritarian management style also lead 
the settlers to view themselves as labourers, rather than self 
sustaining farmers. The result is that the settlers come to 
expect to be t9spoon-fedtN and show few signs of initiative. The 
management position is that provision of these inputs, like the 
tenancy arrangements, is necessary to retain control and to 
ensure that the crop calendar is fulfilled. It is also argued 
that these inputs have to be provided since the settlers have no 
resources of their own. In practice, inputs have not been 
provided on time and yields have been depressed. Yet the tenants 
have no recourse, since charges are automatically deducted from 
the proceeds of the sale of their cotton, which is managed by the 
authorities. Co-operative arrangements might have provided a 
better approach to managing inputs and sales and would have 
encouraged the settlers to become more involved with the scheme. 
One further major disincentive is the producer price of 
cotton, which is controlled by the Cotton Board and estimated to 
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be about 60% of a Rrealisticl~ price which might exist in a free 
market. Low returns hardly provide much incentive for farmers to 
put effort into growing cotton, and the more enterprising farmers 
are able to make more money (and get a better cash flow) by 
selling tomatoes grown on their vegetable plots, to the detriment 
of cotton production. 
Tenants thus have little incentive to tie themselves to 
the project and settle permanently. 
the disincentives are not great, 
The changes needed to remove 
the face of many vested interests. 
but require political will in 
(c) Economies of Scale 
Early studies advocated a minimum project of 15000 ha. 
to achieve economies of scale in the provision of infrastructure 
and abstraction of water from the river by gravity. 
detailed soils 
However,, the 
surveys failed to find more than 4000 ha of 
suitable soils (despite a lowering of the criteria). 
World Bank appraisal, 
project 
a decision was made to proceed 
Following 
with a 
comprising 4000 ha. of suitable soils and 3000 ha. of 
marginal soils. 
marginal 
This decision was taken in the expectation that 
soils would prove successful and that additional areas 
of marginal soils could be developed 
economies. 
later to give scale 
In addition, the unsurveyed East bank of the river was 
thought to have great potential, and helped to sway the decision 
to proceed with the West bank development on 
economies of scale in infrastructure. 
the grounds of 
In practise, the East bank 
soils proved to be no better than the West bank soils, and the yields from the marginal soils were lower than anticipated. The project was thus propelled by a momentum derived 
expectations which later proved unfulfillable. 
from unproven 
At the time of appraisal, returns on investment were 
projected at 13%. However, these were based on allocation of 
certain costs over a wider (future) project base. 
returns 
Realistically, 
were probably well below 10% before the project 
and the rapid cost escalations and static world price of 
started, 
cotton 
quickly led to the project becoming uneconomic. 
of abandonment was raised by the Bank in 
The possibility 
1979, 
construction was underway, 
before major 
but was dismissed by the Government. 
By then, the loan and credit agreements had been signed. 
3.2 Technical Problemg 
The project faced many technical problems, the most 
detrimental of which are discussed briefly below. 
_lal Crow, Yields 
These proved to be well below expectations with cotton 
yielding 70% and maize below 50% of the lowest projections. 
Reasons include the poor soils, poor crop varieties, labour 
shortages, inexperienced farmers, poor reliability of water 
supplies and late inputs. 
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outlined 
One concession to the economies of scale problem 
in 3.1(c) above was that gravity abstraction of water 
was postponed and a diesel pump station built instead. The 
logistics of 
insurmountable, 
fuelling and maintaining the station have proved 
50%. The 
remote location 
and pump availability has been below 
and poor road access have resulted in erratic 
fuel supplies. Procurement of spares from overseas is difficult 
and slow because 
licensing system. 
of foreign exchange problems and the import 
the Government 
Given the location and the poor wages paid by 
sector, it has not been possible to obtain the 
highly skilled mechanics needed to maintain the station. The 
station 
crucially 
is the lynch-pin of the project and success depends 
on'its proper functioning, 
for much of the time. 
yet it has been inoperable 
(cl Housinq 
Settler housing has proved a particular problem in that 
it is extremely difficult to find low cost housing solutions in 
an area devoid of most natural materials. 
adopted, at a cost of KSh. 
The solution finally 
20,000 per house, was a mud and 
mangrove pole structure with rendered walls and a corrugated iron 
roof. In practice, the houses are flexible and the local mud 
expansive, with the result that the rendering falls off, exposing 
the walls to rain erosion. 
collapse within 
The walls disintegrate and many houses 
two to three years of construction. Tenants are 
expected to buy these houses over 20 years through deductions 
made from their cotton sales. 
a great deal of resentment. 
Not surprisingly, this has created 
(dl Choice of Technolocrv 
In many cases, the choice of technology is 
oversophisticated in design and concept, and this results in 
subsequent operating problems. 
- the sophisticated, 
These include problems with: 
(I 
expensive (KSh 12Omn) and complex 
water treatment and distibution system (never operated). 
- the river pump station. 
- a dredger to remove silt from the main.canal (never 
operated). 
- an oversophisticated irrigation system with many 
controls (most of which are never used). 
3.3 Institutional and Mar2qement Problems 
(a) Co-ordinatic;..-. ith other Orqanisations 
One of the major problems has been obtaining support 
from other Goverment bodies, particularly in getting them to take 
over completed infrastructure. The Ministry of Water Development 
refused to accept the new treatment works on the grounds that it 
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did not have a budget line or the staff to run it. 
increased the health risk to settlers. 
This has 
Only temporary 
are available and thus most settlers use canal water for 
supplies 
washing with the commensurate increase in the incidence of water-borne 
diseases. Similarly, the Ministry of Health were three years late 
in taking over a clinic. In the interim period, healthcare was 
provided by the Catholic Sisters but this proved 
given the number and condition of the settlers. 
inadequate, 
Co-ordination with and amongst the aid 
also been poor. 
agencies has 
other 
The main actor has been the World Bank, with the 
agencies taking little part in active monitoring of the 
project. 
/b) Staff DeVelODment 
The World bank appraisal report recognised the weakness 
of the National Irrigation Board as an implementing agency and 
recommended that it should be strengthened. The report also 
recommended the appointment of a team of expatriate managers for 
the first five years of operation. These recommendations were 
included as covenants in the loan agreement, but were 
until the project got out of hand. 
ignored 
to have funded the team, 
By that time the EDF, who were 
decided to withdraw their support. The 
project staff are poorly trained, 
in 
poorly motivated and deficient 
numbers. Qualified and experienced staff are difficult to 
obtain, given the project's location and the salaries offered. 
tc) Overcentralisation 
decisions 
Staff on site have had little authority, with all major 
and procurements being made in Nairobi. Given the 
location and the poor communications, this has resulted in 
unneccessary delays and has lowered the morale of the site staff 
to the detriment of the project and the settlers. 
In 1985, the World Bank conducted a review of the 
project which was highly critical of the way in which it was 
conceived, designed and implemented. As a result of this review, 
i 
the project was taken from the Irrigation Board and set up as a 
separate parastatal under the Ministry of Agriculture, the 
intention being to decentralise decision making and give more 
autonomy to the site staff. (See Appendix B) 
4. Settlement as a Solution to Landlessness and Urban Drift 
The Bura project has proved to be costly and has failed 
to meet its major objectives. The settled population is about 
15,000 compared to an original target of 65,000. The approximate 
cost per'head has risen from XSh.12,500 to XSh.lOO,OOO over the 
life of the project. Although crops are being produced where none 
grew before, the scheme currently requires an operating subsidy 
of XSh.20 million per year. 
The average settler family earns about XSh.5,000 per 
year (excluding the value of subsistance crops). This compares 
with an average rural wage of XSh.3,500 and an average urban wage 
of KSh.5,000, but many families contain more than one wage 
earner, so it is difficult to make direct comparisons. 
Conceptually, the project is unique in Kenya, and in 
many respects, represents a great feat of pioneering. However, 
the institutional framework has not been geared to foster a 
pioneer spirit amongst the settlers. 
The project has faced and is continuing to face 
technical problems which have escalated costs, depressed returns 
and made operation difficult. These however, are probably of less 
importance to the project's performance than the managerial and 
institutional deficiencies. 
Under pressure from the World Bank, the Goverment has 
attempted to dismantle some of the deficiencies, including making 
the scheme more autonomous and abolishing the Cotton Board (See 
Appendix B). 
The World Bank has suggested that the project is not 
replicable, and the failure of the project to meet expectations 
has caused the Government to shy away from similar schemes. The 
Tana Delta rice scheme and the irrigation component of the 
Turkwell Gorge hydroelectric scheme were once both considered as 
settlement possibilities. These are now proceeding on the basis 
of commercial estates with a few outgrowers. This type of 
development is unlikely to have the same impact on unemployment 
and landlessness as settlement, although it is more likely to 
produce an economic return. Thers are also plans to run the semi- 
completed part of the Bura Scheme as an estate in an attempt to 
reduce the operating subsidy. 
Many of the problems which have led Bura to 
underperform are unique to the project and it is perhaps an over- 
reaction to dismiss settlement schemes out of hand. However the 
feasibility of moving people en masse into inhospitable areas and 
expecting them to settle permanently and perform economically 
remains in doubt. 
J.Maos in an article written in 1984 (Ref 1) has 
suggested that state initiated land settlement is the only viable 
settlement option, given the need for public investments in 
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infrastructure and welfare. However, he does say that settlement 
must be matched by proper motivation of settlers. 
He highlights the importance of "human capital formationll in conjunction with the development of physical 
facilities 
rural 
and suggests that the reason for poor returns on many 
ventures (which have produced negative attitudes 
planners), amongst are due to the lack of attention to human factors. 
He also suggests that the evolution from subsistence to 
mixed farming and then to specialised farming is a lengthy 
process involving different physical elements and social organisation at each stage. Settlement projects often jump straight to specialised farming (as at Bura) without treading the 
evolutionary path. Inexperienced farmers are expected to 
out the complex husbandry practices associated with specia??:; 
farming from the beginning. 
It thus seems likely that the performance expectations 
of such projects are too high in the early years. However, revising the early year expectations has a negative effect on 
cash flows and hence on project economics. It might be questioned 
whether discounted cash flow techniques represent the best 
criteria on which to judge the merit of such projects. 
. 
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5 . Alternatives to Settlement 
There are several alternatives to settlement of the 
arid and semi-arid areas as a solution to the problems of 
landlessness. 
(a) Increase Waae Earnincr Sector 
The present Government policy is aimed at increasing 
the wage earning sector through promotion of industrialisation. 
The lVdistrict focustt has become the cornerstone of rural 
development with much emphasis placed on the growth of the small 
and intermediate towns as (agro-) industrial centres as a means 
of bridging the rural-urban llgaptt. 
Urban growth has recently been at a rate of 8% per 
annum, compared to rural growth of '2.8%. 15% of.Xenyans now live 
in urban areas and this is expected to double by the year 2000. ' . 
Urban growth does appear, however, to be less polarised towards 
Nairobi and Mombasa and the secondary towns are growing at a 
faster rate than the major cities. Obudho (Ref 2) has commented 
that "the choice is not whether or not urbanisation should take 
place, but what form it should take". 
The major problem is in attracting industry to the 
secondary towns, given the inclination of industrialists to 
choose the major urban centres where the infrastructure and 
services are well established. 
I 
This policy does little to attack the problem of 
landlessness and the need for increased agricultural production 
directly, but goes part way to providing a solution to 
unemployment. 
The "estate" type developments described in Section 4. 
are one method of tackling the joint problems of unemployment and 
agricultural output, but do little to satisfy the Xenyans' H1usttf 
for land. 
_(bl Taxation of tlIdletg Land and/or Division of Estates 
Taxation of "idle" land as a means of promoting sale 
(and hence use), has been suggested as a way of increasing 
production and employment and seems a reasonable approach. 
However, it is unclear exactly how much land is “idleN*, or how to 
judge what constitutes V1idlelt land. The idea may thus have 
practical limitations. 
Subdividing some of the large (and efficient) estate 
farms has also been proposed, although this may have 
repercussions for export earnings if a move from cash crops to 
subsistence farming were to result. Rempel (Ref 3) has suggested 
that this need not be the case and cites evidence from Nyeri 
district that shows that crop intensification on small farms can 
be highly productive and provide substantial employment, provided 
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ready access to markets and institutional support for inputs and new technologies (varieties, techniques, etc.) is available. He suggests that the weakness of present systems is the lack of 
production incentives due to internal producer and foreign 
exchange pricing policies. Provision of clear title to land is 
also seen as vital for boosting output by giving small farmers access to credit. 
There is also increasing pressure to make land available by redrawing 
national parks, 
the boundaries of game reserves and 
although this is resisted by the conservation 
lobby and on the grounds that it may damage tourism if taken too 
far. 
(Cl Settlement of LeSS Inhosmitable Areas 
also 
Settlement of less remote and 'inhospitable regions is 
a possibility. .Various plans for abstracting water for irrigation from Lake Victoria are being considered, 
is not known whether subsequent 
although it 
development would involve 
settlement. 
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6. Conclusions 
The World Bank have reported (Ref 4) that Kenya does 
not have enough land to support its population at subsistence 
level farming. While higher level inputs in denser areas mean 
that people can be supported at present, the rapid growth in 
population will place increasing pressure on the land if self 
sufficiency is to be maintained. Most Xenyans seem to have an 
inherant desire to own their own land and a direct solutuion, 
either through subdivision or settlement of undeveloped lands, 
seems to be required. 
Settlement appears to be an expensive and ambitious 
solution to the problems of landlessness, urban drift and 
unemployment, and some of the alternatives seem to provide better 
answers. However, given the rapidly rising population, and the 
institutional problems which need to be overcome to make some of 
the alternatives viable, it may be that the attack needs to take 
place 'on all fronts, including more settlement projects. 
, The Bura project has provided a useful insight into the 
practical problems of settlement and it can only be hoped that 
the lessons learnt will be instrumental in determining a 
framework for any possible future developments. The project is 
still young and has not really been given the chance to perform. 
Early conditions have not been favourable and expectations were 
perhaps too high. Given time and some institutional changes, it 
is still possible that the project could make a useful 
contribution to the problems of landlessness and urban drift. 
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Bura management shaken up 
Donors have decided aqainst further 
exPans,on of the controversial Bura 
~rngation Prolect. on which S 70 million 
has been sPent so far. Thev have, 
however, endorsed a restrucwrmq plan 
and, on 30 June, manaaement of the 
scheme was taken out of the hands of 
the state Nnionel Irrigation Board and 
Placed under a new qovernment authority 
established soeclficaltv for the Project. 
The autnorltv - whtch has yet to be 
named - has been set uo after Prolonged 
dlscusslons between government and 
donors. wnich had earller Plnpotnted 
admmtstratlon as a prlnctoal reason for 
Bura’s financial oroolems. Donors, wn~cn 
mlude rhe World Bank. EEC, 
Netherlands and the UK. have now opted 
for llmlted financial commnments to 
consoltdare the scheme. 
It ii hnped Bura will become viable If it 
concentrates on :he exlsrmq lrrlqated 
area of 2.500 hectares. Limited 
Concesstonarv suPPort !o increase rhe 
oroducrwv of land already under 
culttvatlon IS exoectw from some 
quarters. The Ftnnlsh lnternartonal 
DnveloPment Aqencv (Finnlda) IS soon 
to sign an aqreement to undenvrue a 
fuelwood proqramme and manaqement 
of a rlverlne foresrrv scheme. The UK 
Overseas Develooment Admlnlstrarlon 
(OOA) IS Ilkely to finance a swdv of a 
lowterm qcavltv offtake water SUPPIV 
and the Nerherlands mav also suPPly 
aqricultural inPuts for the 1985186 
cotton season. 
TheWorld Bank WI/I conrmue to 
support Bura with the 8 13 mullion 
undlsbursed balance of INS 840 mlllion 
loan (AED 14-12 84, Paqe 3). The bank 
IS now neqotlatlnq CIVII works contracts 
TO house a pump Station. link exlstlnq 
qenerarors into a qrld system and butId 
schools. 
6th July 1985 
Jura scheme under review 
A World Bank ream began a two-week 
‘evlew of the management and financial 
ssPects of the troualed Bura irngation 
icheme on 2 December. its findmgs will 
jetermIne whether the bank extends 
fisbursemenr of jts $40 mtlllon funding 
:ommitment for a third time to cover the 
‘irst nalf of 1986. 
Efficient management 1s seen as crucial 
o solving the scheme’s flnanclal 
Iroblems. The Agriculture Mln1stt-y took 
lver management from the National 
rrigation Board on 1 July 1r-t a old to set 
ton Its feet (AED 6.7.85). However, 
ources have told AED that the 
)Peratlonal adjustments set out .oy the 
)ank at the time of the transfer have not 
/et been made. 
The cost of the scheme - which got 
mder way ln 1977 and IS 51111 I” the PIlot 
tage - has doubled to an estimated S 93 
n!ll~on and is St111 rlsmg. However, the 
Vorld Bank’s line of credit remams fixed, 
orcmg Kenya to find alternative 
inancmg sources or bear a local cost 
:omPonent much larger than orlgtnallv 
nvlsaged. The European Oevelopment 
:und. the UK and the Netherlands are 
#lreadv Prowding finance of iust over 
.CU 15 mlllion (S 13 million). f5 mlllion 
S 7 3 million) and DFt 30.3 million 
K 10.6 million) resoectlvelv 
So :ar only 2.000 nectares ot tne phasf 
one target of 6.500 nectaresvnder food 
ano casn croos nave oeen olanted. The 
governmenr IS now consldermg halvmg 
tne orolect s area and leasmg the 
,eFabnoer ‘or commercial exPloltatlon 
Bura s Jnllketv to be closed down as 
: XC ‘amIles from all over the country 
qave alreaav oeen resettled. 
7th December 1985 
Loan agfeament due in May 
The first tranche of a $60 million Wohd 
Bank agncultural sector loan WIII almost 
defimtely be drawn down III the Second half 
of 1986. sources in Nalrobl have told AED. 
Final agreement IS expected in May, they 
add (AED 12:4:86). 
The oolicy-based loan IS wewed as World 
Bank approval of measures mstlgated by 
the government to revltallse the 
agncultural sector through stlmulatmg 
3nvate market forces. A key factor IS the 
‘ecent government deaslon to allow 
‘armers to bypass the trouoled Natlonal 
Ceresls h ihuduc. Board (NCPB) and j 
sell directly to millers. However. observers: 
point outthat the dmztlve has not been 
leglslared and may be withdrawn as soon ’ 
as the current mazeglut IS absorbed. 
The government’s previous refusal to 
corwaer ortvate-sector gram marketmg 
was me chief factor leading to a World 
Bat% veto on funher structural adjustment 
loans limed toacross-the-board pokey 
cnanges. The last structural adjustment 
loan was granted ln 1963. 
The way for the loan has also been paveo 
by the government’s dectslon to aboltsh 
the state-fun Cotton Lint 6 Snd 
MarkoHng Board. Low produce prices 
offered to farmers Dy thecash-strapped 
, parastatal discouraged cotton productron 
and threatened the economic vlabtllty of 
hecontroverslal imgared cottonqrowmg 
scheme at Bura. a costly aid project which 
has recetved substanhal World Bank 
subsldles (AED 8:2:86). 
26th Apr .1 1986 , 
Bus rescue bid expected 
Rescue measures for the !Il.srarrad Eura 
Irrlgarlon scheme are to be taken soon, 
followmg discussions between a vls;rlng 
World Bank team and Agriculture 
Minlstrv officials in the week ended : 
February. 
The river-fed cotton scheme has oeen 
Plagued by financial oroblems. wltn 
costs doubling to an estimated S 93 
mllllon since its lnceptlon In 1977. 
maklng It :he most exoenslve frrlgatlon 
scheme in the world 3otn donorsand 
mIntstry officals are concerned by an 
lnedectuatecotton marxeting system 
mismanagement and under-utlllsatlon 
of land. Although 6.000 hectares are 
avaliable for Planting only a third were 
DUI under conon last season 
P-rsident Mot labelled Bura a ‘disgrace 
wnen le vwted the prop?ct at me ena of 
January and called for correcrrons in ts 
management. “For me first :Ime the 
government has recognised that all as not 
well Peopln are exoectlng decisions to of 
taken and acted on.” an agrculturai 
economist told AED. 
The Agrculture Mintstry is exoected 
to review several opttons to put Sura 
back onto a sound economic footing 
aver the next few months. Sources 
close to [he scheme say avenues being 
e%plOred Pomt t0 Prlvare-secror and 
development agency involvement on a 
commercial basis. 
It has been suggested that !ne state- 
owned Conon Lins & Seed Merketmg 
Board be relieved of IIS monopoly to 
allow textlle milts and prlvare and co. 
OPerarIve gmnerles to buv from Bura 
a1 market prices. Another prooosal to 
boost OutPut :s to lease land to a 
development-oriented agency to esaollsr 
a nuCleuS estate ‘with outgrowers. The 
agencv would Probaolv rhen be asxeo 
to Provide management and sepuces :or 
the entlre scneme. 
The UK’s Overseas Development 
Admlnlstration (ODA) IS funding a 
feaSlbllitV study on ways to expand 
the ~rrlgaale area from 2.300 nectares to 
5.800 hectares. Sources sav the scheme s 
temOOrarv alesel pumps WIII be reolaced 
w a grawtv offtake svstem furher go 
rhe Tana rwer at a cost of S LI mllllon-j 
-_-- -_ 
million - heightenmg the need to find 
additional finance. 
The scheme’s oackers to date are ODA. 
the EuroPean Development Fund. and 
the Netherlands, which have provfdw a 
total of lust over 8 30 million The 
World Bank has still to disburse about a 
quarter of its 837 mllilon contrtburlon 
to the orolect (AED 7 12 86). 
8th February 1986 
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INTERNATIONAL BANK LENDING TO DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES - THE EXAMPLE OF COSTA RICA 
BY 
RAYMOND MOWLL 

1NTRODUCTION:THE LENDING BOOM 
During the period 1975 to 1982, 
expansion in the amount of 
there occured an unprecedented 
institutions in Japan, 
credit extended by lending 
Europe and North America to countries 
throughout Latin America, 
international 
Africa, Eastern Europe and Asia. The 
bankers were all but trampled in the rush to board 
planes for loan signing ceremonies in New York, London, Paris, 
Frankfurt or wherever.The celebrations seemed never-ending, as 
new borrowers, and old borrowers with new financing needs were 
wined, dined and financed in extravagant surroundings. 
following the binge were in the shape of debt 
Hangovers 
which 
reschedulings, 
as they continue to take place one after another, cause bankers'and borrowers.to look back on the period with dismay.The 
banks have seen their capital adequacy put under severe 
strain,and their profits continue to suffer from the.effects of 
loan write-offs.Many of the borrowers now have great difficulty 
raising any new money, except for those which are so highly 
indebted that their default would threaten the western banking 
and economic systems.These 
obtain 
particular borrowers are able to 
additional funds just to help them meet interest due on 
existing facilities. 
Why did all this occur? Why did the mainly conservative, 
cautious financial institutions of the west lend several billions 
of dollars worth of other peoples money to Mexico, 
Brazil ?, nations 
Argentina and 
knowledge. 
where banks often had neither experience or 
What lay behind the dramatic scramble to lend and 
what results did this have on the borrowers? 
This paper 
explosion in 
will focus on one of the countries affected by the 
lending and will suggest some of the possible 
reasons behind the bankers' actions. 
is Costa Rica, 
The country I will look at 
a small central American state which within three 
years between 1979 ahd 1982 acquired an external debt which 
exceeds four billion US dollars,roughly equal to the country's 
total GDP in 1984 (in these terms Costa Rica is in fact the 
world's most indebted nation). I will look at Costa Rica's 
economic and political positon prior to when the borrowing began, 
starting in 1979,the first year of the Carazo administration. I 
will then consider how the borrowing progressed and 
this has had on the economic and political 
the impact 
condition of the 
country. Finally, I will look at Costa Rica's current situation 
and how its position and that of other debtor nations has now 
altered with respect to its international bank creditors. 
OPEC,SURPLUSES AND RECYCLING 
The most often quoted reason for the expansion in banks' 
international lending during the 1970s is that they were involved 
in some enormous effort to keep the world economy moving by means 
of 'recycling' 
nations. 
the surpluses built up by the oil producing 
Without this recycling, oil importing nations would have 
been forced to cut purchases of crude or other imports, or reduce 
the level of consumption within their nations.If such 
restrictions had taken place in the economies of Africa ,Latin 
America and Asia, then lower levels of consumpton would have led 
to lower imports which 
recession in the 'd&eloped I 
in turn would have deepened the 
economies as their export markets 
contracted:The banks then; were keeping the world economy afloat. 
by allowing OPEC surpluses to be spent by poor countries , and ' 
keeping the western economies 0 functioning without too much 
disruption or recession. 
Where the banks made loans available for 
balance of payments I 
'general financing, 
purposes the effect was to deter the oil 
importing nations from undertaking the extensive structural 
changes that the massive transfer of wealth to OPEC should have 
demanded.In fact, by avoiding these policies , the demand for oil 
and thereby it's price was 
high.The surpluses 
allowed to remain artificialiy 
continued to be earned by oil.producers and 
the economies of oil importers continued to be unbalanced.If some 
lowering of aggregate demand in the 
taken place in 
developing countries had 
1974 or 1979 
the price was increased , 
,reducing demand for oilat the time 
then the fall in prices for crude now 
being seen could have occurred several years earlier. 
The type of loans that would have best helped the developing 
i 
countries to meet the wealth draining effects of the oil price 
increase 
imported 
were those that would either reduce dependence on 
oil or help to generate real wealth. If the surpluses 
had been directly placed by OPEC members into projects in the 
developing nations then some return on these investments ,other 
than the rate of interest on bank loans, would have been 
reguired.However the surplus holders abrogated this duty and 
the banks, as will be seen later, chose in the most part not to 
pursue the 'project' type 
purpose facility,where 
loan but to look for the more general 
the end use by the borrower was not a 
major concern.It did not matter to the banks if the loan was to 
end up in the president's private bank account in Miami or if it 
was to be used for some wealth generating project. 
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WHY DID BANXS LEND TO COSTA RICA ? 
As with most financial decisions the theory and practice differ 
quite considerably.The reasoning behind a bank's choice of policy 
towards 
not 
a country and the level and type of loans it makes to it 
Znancial 
always the rational choice between alternatives that 
institutions might wish outsiders to believe.Within 
each bank there will exist a number of competing forces: some in 
favour of a policy or loan and others against it .At the 
operating levels, 
because 
a facility may be extended to a borrower simply 
the sponsors choose a particular day on which to present 
a proposal to the bank's credit committee, 
opponents are known to be absent. 
when possible 
The following list of factors that lie behind a bank's decision to lend are intended to provide 
some idea of the lack.of concern for the effect of such loans on 
their recipient, be it Costa Rica or any other developing nation. 
(i) 'Pressure' .Placed on individuals, teams and divisions within 
the bank to meet performance goals that are normally set in terms 
of amounts of business done.Quality of loans (in terms of their 
liklihood to be repaid and therefore their effect on the 
borrowers wealth) if not entirely'discounted, became more of an 
obstacle to be overcome rather than a principle to be adhered to. 
(ii) 'Follow the leader'.Many banks lack the necessary human and 
technical facilities to undertake extensive credit investigtaion 
on borrowers. Major loans tended to be syndicated amongst banks 
in such a way that smaller,less experienced organisations become 
victims of what is described in the market as 
larger banks will take a major position in a loan 
lstuffingl.The 
seeking to 
sell down much of their commitment.Smaller banks will'be drawn to 
a facility because of the presence of their 
competitors.In 
grander 
extreme versions small banks will lend to unknown 
borrowers. 
(iii) 'The guarantee'. 
requires 
Consider the example of a project that 
external finance. The prospective banks 
undertake their cash flow analyses 
lending 
,forecasting etc, and 
determine that the project looks a little risky and may not 
create wealth( intheir terms 
and 
,produce enough income to meet costs 
repay theloan 
altogether, 
facility).Instead of turning away from it 
they look for a guarantee, which will take the risk 
off the project and onto a guarantor.From the bank's point of 
view ,it is no longer reliant upon the success or failure of the 
project. If it fails then they simply look to the guarantor for 
repayment( who may have lacked the analytical tools to undertake 
a thorough review of the project , or the ability to track its 
progress). 
3 
(iv) I Fear of being left out'.Another way of explaining this 
phenomenon would be 'greed '.For example the Cracker National Bank 
of California did not like to see other large U.S. banks creaming 
the market in Mexico.Their results were being compared 
unfavourably with those of banks making high returns from Latin 
America.Not surprisingly Cracker moved into the market.At such 
times banks are described as being 'agressive' ,meaning that thay 
were prepared to accept lower returns and higher risks that 
existing lenders. 
PJ) 'The Global Bank' Closely linked to (iv) above but having 
more of a 'strategic 'aspect to it . Some of the giant banks like 
Citicorp, and Bank of America began to believe that they had to 
become involved in every market in the world in order to merit 
the title of 'Global Bankl.The policy led these organisations in . 
odd places ,where profit could be achieved only ' very from the 
crumbs left by indigenous baks or by drawing in the parent 
organisation from New York or California to offer large chunks of 
money, to what were often lower quality borrowers. 
(vi) 'Countries do not go bust'.Banks derived comfort from the 
fact that whereas a corporation could be forced into liquidation, 
a country would not do so.Countries do default though and banks 
remained remarkably unaware of the impact of their excessive 
lending .in making such situations possible. 
(vii) 'The IMP as lender.of last resort'. Undue consolation is 
obtained from the role of the IMF and its' provision of special 
facilities to assist debtor nations.By the time the IMF becomes 
involved, the situation has normally gone too far, and loans are 
likely to need rescheduling.Far better , one might argue , that 
the IMF become involved at an earlier stage ,where it can better 
regulate the borrowing activities of the debtor nation.However, 
IMF delegations with their prescriptions of consumption 
restrictions are not welcome in many countries and the 
organisation does not entirely perceive it's role as being 
proactive . 
(viii) 'Credit Analysis'. This is actually what the banks 
consider to be the cornerstone of any lending proposal, an 
analysis of the creditworthiness of borrowers.The normal practice 
is to establish a number of criteria, to include certain 'key' 
ratios, that a lending proposal has to meet.In the case of a 
country, the criteria are set in terms of GDP growth, foreign 
debt levels,export and import trends, public spending ,budget 
defecits and the like.Unfortunately the data is normally up to 
two years out of date and therefore of limited value. With so 
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many banks relying on the same information,their actions in the 
intervening two years may serve to totally alter the picture.The 
very fact that acountry turns in a set of impressive data one 
year 
thay 
will encourage bankers to increase lending .In doing so 
credit 
are of course destroying those very factors that 
risk look good in the first place; made the 
service etc. 
foreign debt ,debt 
(ix) Helping with the economic 
borrowers. 
,political and social progress of 
banking 
I have left this till last because in eight years of 
I never once saw this as a justification 
Nevertheless, I have 
for lending. 
included it in the expectation that 
banks do consider this as important. some 
The factors mentioned above 
decisions by banks to 
,that provided much of the basis for 
great 
lend to developing countries are to' a * 
extent indications of their wish to justify iending ' spite' of the apparent unsuitability of the recipient of 4;: 
funds.Driven by individual and corprate ambitions to increase 
lending to a particular nation, 
spurious 
a bank could find all manner of 
justificatons for its' activities.The concept of 
countries never going 'bust' 
to help 
or of the IMF always standing by 
nations. 
out did not make l;ans any better for the borrowing 
As the banks believed in these ultimate saviours ISO their lending criteria were lessened and they began to pour money 
into countries with little or no concern whether their 
was creating wealth or not. financing Much of this was due to the reliance 
on 'general purpose, 
facility, 
balance of payments support' type of requiring minimal involvement in establishing the use 
to which money was put. 
There are basically two types of facility offered to borrowers in 
countries ; 
capital 
the general purpose or balance of payments/ working 
above,the 
facility or the project related loan.As mentioned 
general purpose facility does not require the bank to 
undertake an analysis of the,viability of any particular project 
whether it will be of benefit to the borrowing nation. In the 
\. izoject lending situation 
creating 
the'bank becomes reliant on the welth 
capabilities of'the particular project. The bank will 
therefore be lending on the strength of it's own forecasts 
relying on its' belief that the project will create and 
wealth so suffi&cient as to meet costs and make 
types 
repayment possible. 
of lending impose much greater discipine on the banks Such 
the borrowers, and 
more continuous 
but require more work, better qualified staff,and 
assessment and monitoring of the project.Far 
easier is the general purpse facility,where repayment is not down 
to specific performance ,but can be attributed to some vaguely 
expressed expectations of macro economic performance. 
5. 
THE IMPACT OF FOREIGN DEBT ON COSTA RICA 
Costa Rica acquired the title of 'Switzerland of Central America' 
in part due to its' natural beauty, but to a greater extent 
because of its' stability,financial conservatism and well managed 
economy.It is a small nation,with only 2.2 million people (95% of 
whom are literate) and a GDP per capita in 1980 of US$ 2,200.At 
that time inflation was beginning to rise from its average of 
10% throughout the period 1970 to 1979. The country is 
politically very stable,relies on elections rather than coups for 
changes of government , and in fact disbanded the army back in 
1948. 
Although Costa Rica had run a current account, defecit .for twenty 
years up to 1977 it had managed to keep the level'of foreign . 
debt down to manageable levels.By 1977 total foreign debt was US$ 
830 million, requiring around 15% of the country's 
earnings 
export 
to meet capital repayments and interest obligations, a 
relatively low level of debt service. By 1980 the picture was 
beginning to alter dramatically.The administration of President 
Carazo had begun to enter into large foreign loan agreements ,of 
a size that pushed the foreign debt up to US$ 1.6 billion by the 
end of 1981.By the time Carazo left office in 1982 , the foreign 
debt had reached US$ 3.7 billion, and required an unmanageable 
60% of export earnings to service it. 
Costa Rica was not too badly directly affected by the oil price 
increase but did suffer from the resultant world recession, as 
demand for commodities slumped . Foreign exchange was 
mainly from coffee 
generated 
and banana sales (43% of total exports in 
1980), and prices for both of these fell in the late 1970s.The 
government of Carazo instead of devaluing the Costa Rican 
currency, sought to mkintain its' value in order that import 
costs should not rise.Most of the countrysl imports were 
manufactured goods ,intended primarily for the consumption of the 
middle classes ( they accounted for 80% of the total in 1980, as 
against just 11% for oil). Raising prices is+ not always 
politically wise and perhaps the Carazo administration, if not 
Carazo hiself (presidents can seL7fe only one term in Costa Rica) 
had hopes of winning the 1982 election. 
The results of the administrations' policies was to draw in 
foreign goods whilst exports were slumping.Instead of theexchange 
responding to the changing terms of trade it was held steady at 
8.: to the dollar.Inevitably the trade gap widened and the 
cc cry was able to finance the defecit and meet inkerest and 
ca-,,: al obligations on existing debt , only by borrowing more. 
Only when the IMF became involved in Costa Rica's 
following the request for the maximum possible support f~~~%~: 
was the Carazo administration forced to alter it's policies 
Until then it had been able to continue along a 
was leading to national bankruptcy. 
path that 
The western banks had made 
little effort to limit their,loans to the country up until the 
time when the IMF was called in.The first actions of the IMF , as 
in most other Latin American nations that it became involved in 
around this period, was to link the provision of support 
facilities with the adoption of a demand restriction programme by 
the government The IMF was in effect imposing the 
demand limitatiois that Costa Rica and other developing aggregate nations should have gone through in 1974/75 and 1979/80 and would have 
had to undergone had it not been for the recycling efforts of the 
banks. . 
For Costa Ricans this aggregate management was felt in a number of ways.The currency, previously supportd by foreign 
inflows in the form of loans capital and later through exchange control 
was allowed to float down to a level that more accurately 
reflected the country's trading position.Imports fell off as the 
Colon sank from 8.6 to the US $ to a rate of nearly 15. Public 
sector spending , previously buoyed up by foreign borrowing was 
cut and taxes were increased to both reduce demand and narrow the 
budget defecit.Certain prices were decontrolled and subsidies 
removed , with fuel increasing by 27%. 
The intended effect of these measures was to reduce consumption 
. by Costa Rica and allow a greater part of its' national wealth to 
be transferred to those foreign creditors that had allowed the 
country to avoid the painful process of wealth diversion some 
years earlier. 
By the time the Carazo administration gave way to the government 
of Albert0 Monge in 1982, Costa Rica was effectively bankrupt. 
The foreign debt of around US $3.5 billion, cotinued to increase 
as Costa Rica was forced to default on 
these were capitalised 
interest payments, and 
The exchange rate fall 
imports but exports remainid at much the same 
had reduced 
levels allowing the country only a small improvement in the balance of' payments, 
but still in defecit. Such was the extent of foreign debt ,and 
the level of US interest rates that Costa Rica was having to make 
great efforts just to keep the situation from getting even 
worse.GDP fell by 2% in 1982 and 4% in 1983 inflation rose to 
90% and the freed exchange rate continued to iall to around 22 to 
the dollar.It is probably impossible to estimate how much more 
difficult the adjustment was in 1982/3 than it would have been had it taken place in 1974/5 and 1979/80. What is clear though is 
that with the exception of some limited expansion of the capacity 
of the electrical generating industry of the country, Costa Rica 
had little to show for the massive debt that it had 
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incurred.Borrowing had been mainly for the purpose of maintaining 
current levels of consumption and not for the investments that 
would have created the wealth to allow the transfer of wealth to oil producers and/or creditors. The banks had failed 
utterly to impose any such requirements on Costa Rica's use of 
loans and in doing so perhaps they should share blame with 
the Carkzo administration ;or Costa Rica's current plight. 
Such an argument does not find favour 
community 
amongst the banking 
who have now relegated Costa Rica to the status of 
'basket case' and a subject for IMF handouts. Even 
is handled half-heartedly, 
rescheduling 
as individual bank's exposures do not 
represent large amounts when compared with the several billions 
they, have outstanding in Mexico or Argentina. Indeed, such is the'lack of concern for Costa Rica's eventual recovery that many 
facilities have already been 'written'off. ' 
Whether a bank should share blame with it's borrowers when 
loans cannot be repaid leads one into difficult areas 
who is best qualified to decide what paths a regarding 
should go down. 
developing country 
However, whatever one believes about the rights 
of developing countries to pursue certain strategies, no matter 
how ludicrous these may appear to the western observer, it is 
nevertheless difficult not to feel that many debtor natiors are 
now suffering because of the international banks activities in 
the decade folowing the first oil shock of 1974. 
: . i 
,. 
:.. 
** 
I 
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SUMMARY 
The experience of Costa Rica between 1974 and 1982 is similar to 
that experiencd 
period. 
by many other developing nations during the 
Faced with higher oil prices and recession these nations 
had the choice between taking immediate action to reduce consumption or to borrow funds to allow them to maintain current 
levels. Even if they had borrowed money to invest 
that would create future wealth 
in projects 
this would not have solved the 
problem of reducing current con&mption. 
the easiest possible route 
In fact ,in most cases 
borrowed was utilised 
( in the short term ) was taken.Money 
nations 
to prop up the balance of 
that should have adjusted exchange rates 
payments of 
imports for consumption 
and thereby 
the oil price increases. 
,,following the wealth draining effects of 
The choice of alternatives' to'be 
nations 
adopted by the developing 
was made easier by the readiness of international banks to provide funds for any purpose that the borrowers needed,The internal pressures and performance criteria of the banks was such 
that they rarely got involoved with questions regarding the use 
of the funds that they were providing.Their irresponsibility in 
this respect makes the current attitude towards overdue loans in 
developing countries more difficult to accept.From a positon of 
wooing the borrowers, the banks now barely manage to spare enough 
time for the rescheduling efforts. 
ease with which 
Perhaps the final irony is the 
supposedly profligate borrowers can in fact return to credibility in the eyes of the western bankers.During 
one of the few economic peaks enjoyed by Mexico since 1982, the incredible phenomenon of banks again looking to put 
the country 
money into 
was observable .A11 that is needed is a few monthes 
of favourable figures on economic performance and the outstanding 
foreign debt of around US $ 90 billion was beginning to drift 
into the background .None of the lessons on debt service the 
need for consumption restriction and exchange adjustments s;eemed 
to have been learnt. Costa Rica has yet to return to favour with 
the banks 
related 
,though some are already extending 'short term ,trade 
'facilities ( which can be defaulted on as easily as 
medium term loans). It is a depressing thought that if Costa Rica 
ever does manage to shake of its burdensome debt ,then the 
smiling bankers would soon be tripping off the planes once more 
at San Jose airport. 
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ARMS AND THE THIRD WORLD 
BY 
IAN NIXEY 
~_-__I __- ~--- 
. 
‘Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every 
rocket fired, signifies, in a final sense, a theft from 
those who hunger and are not fed, from those who are cold 
and are not clothed. 
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER 
. . . * . 
. . 
‘The.increase of armaments that is intended in each nation ’ 
to produce consciousness of strength and a sense of 
security, does not produce these effects. On the contrary, 
it produces a consciousness of the strengths of other 
nations and a sense of fear. Fear begets suspicion and 
distrust and evil imaginings of all sorts, till each 
government feels it would be criminal and a betrayal of its 
own country not to take every precaution, while every 
government regards every precaution 0: every other 
government as evidence of hostille intent. 
LORD GREY OF FALLODEN 
after the First World War 
‘You bastards. I knew we shouldn’t have trusted you.’ 
MBA STUDENT 
after the disarmament game 
INTRODUCTION 
It seems to be a common assumption that there is a choice 
between giving food and medical aid to the third world, 
which must be ‘good’, 
which must be ‘bad’. 
and supplying weapons of destruction, 
Statistics on the relative costs of arms and aid appear to 
speak for themselves. 
It may seem an irony that it was a former US Defence 
Secretary, Robert MacNamara, who as President of the World 
Bank in 1976, told his Governors:., . . . ‘- . 
‘. . * 
. 
No statistics could illustrate the inhuman degradation 
to which the vast majority of the citizens of the 
Third world are condemned by poverty. Malnutrition 
saps their energy f stunts their bodies, and shortens 
their lives. Illiteracy darkens their minds, and 
forecloses their futures. Simple preventable diseases 
maim and kill their children. Squalor and ugliness 
pollute and poison their surroundings. The miraculous 
gift of life itself, and all its intrinsic 
potential-so promising and rewarding for us-is eroded 
and reduced for them to a desperate effort to survive. 
It has been estimated that $200 million-the cost of two 
strategic bombers-would be sufficient to free the thousand 
million illiterates in the world from their handicap. 
Five million child deaths each year in developing areas 
could be cured by a vaccination programme costing $600 
million. 
, In the world as a whole, at least 1 in 4 of all the 
scientists and engineers working on research and 
development are working on weapons. World spending on 
military research and development is rising much faster 
than military spending as a whole. 
To what extent are detractors ,c?f the arms trade correct? To 
what extent are arms and aid interchangeable? 
I started by looking at the magnitude and nature of the 
arms trade: who sold arms, and who bought them? 
Why were the arms bought? 
Was there a positive side to this trade, and if so what was 
it? 
ARMS BUYERS 
Details of spending are at appendix A. The first table 
shows expenditure as a percentage of gnp and per capita, 
but is about ten years out of date. The second shows the 
most recent figures available for imports of major weapons 
by third world countries.(Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute figures). 
The third world 
combi*nation 
received 65,% of all arms traded in 1984. . . The bf . world economic recess.io,n and’mounting ’ 
foreign debt has ‘reduced spending in ‘recent years! although 
a share of 
iznerally 
national income, arms expenaiture has 
increased. As the g:aph at appendix A shows, 
imports rose dramatically in the 7Os, to decline slowly in 
the ’80s. 
Spending in South America has declined since the Falklands 
conflict. A number of military regimes have been replaced 
by civilian governments, although little military reduction 
has ensued. 
In Central America spending in COSta Rica, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, ~1 Salvador and Guatamala grew by 60% (on top of 
inflation) between 1979 and 1983: the position is clouded 
by military aid from foreign sources. 
iiak 
south Asia and the Far East growth has slowed after a 
in 1981/1982. 
In the middle East expenditure has declined slightly. US 
aid has enabled some growth in expenditure in Egypt, and 
has lessened the cuts which inflation would have forced on 
Israel. 
The decline in imports by the Third World is in part due to 
a substantial growth in domestic arms manufacture. Indeed, 
in 1984 2% of arms traded internationally were produced in 
developing countries. 
A chart at appendix B shows production capability in these 
areas. 
ARMS SUPPLIERS 
The main suppliers are the USA (40% of world trade) and the 
Soviet Union (32%). However, the Soviet share is declining 
steadily. This may be a reluctance to part with high 
technology, and a recognition by buyers that previously 
supplied equipment has not performed well. The share of 
European exporters is growing, (See appendix C), in 
addition to the growth of domestic production. 
Arms are often supplied purely to increase a countries 
overseas trade. In 1980, Mrs Thatcher, speaking at a dinner 
of the Defence Manufacturers Association said that 
Britain’s current arms exports of E1200m. per annum were 
not enough, and called for an increased sales drive to earn 
money abroad and provide employment. 
At other times, the supply (or.witholding) of arms is used 
.. as an instrument-of foreign policy. . . ..- . . : *. . . . . 
Exports of relatively dated equipment can help major powers 
to offset the high costs of their own replacement 
programmes. 
THE REASONS FOR BUYING ARMS 
It is often hard to say what the purpose of an army is. It 
may be to fight a war, to prepare for a war which is never 
fought, national security, aid to the civil power at times 
of unrest; it may be the instrument by which the ruler . 
maintains power, or merely a symbol of national sovereignty 
and independence. 
The uncertainty or ambiguity of role makes it very 
difficult to apply normal economic criteria. The perceived 
need to cope with any eventuality can lead to a high level 
of defence spending, which is further compounded by any 
increase in a potential enemies spending, and by the rate 
of technical change of military hardware. 
Weapons are not only used to deter attack, but also to wage 
war. It is often difficult to define a war, as the 
Falklands illustrated: nonetheless Kende lists 119 wars 
between 1945 and 1975, witha total duration of over 350 
years. The bulk of these wars, 12 a day on average, are 
fought in the Third World, with weapons supplied mainly by 
the developed countries. * 
Armies are often thought to be in a unique position to 
obtain the resources they want if they are in power: yet as 
appendix A shows, military regimes do not spend more than 
civilian ones. 
Nor do repressive, authoritarian regimes spend more than 
their neighbours. Haiti, Malawi, Swaziland, Paraguay, 
Nicaragua, Argentina and Uganda are comparitively low 
. 
. 
military spenders. In part, of course, this may reflect the 
fact that internal repression is relatively inexpensive. 
This table also shows that while per capita spending can 
vary greatly, it is the exception rather than the rule for 
military spending to exceed 10% of GNP, with a median 
expenditure of 3 or 4%. 
ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE ARMS TRADE 
e The difficulties surrounding,this issue begin to be.seen in 
the report commissioned by the Parliamentary Human Rights 
Group in 1980, to inquire into questions relating. to the 
sale of arms and technology and human rights violations. 
The issues do not begin and end with weapon systems. One 
chairman reported: 
It is not impossible that concrete mixers supplied by 
our company might be used to make concrete for gun 
emplacements somewhere in the world. 
.and as another emphasised: 
Unfortunately, since military and police are human 
based, everything has a military or police capability 
from a glass of water upwards. 
The general view seems to be that the demand for arms 
exists: failure to supply will mean the customer going 
elsewhere. It would be unsound economically not to supply I 
unless there were overriding political considerations. 
Exports enabled longer production runs, and hence lower 
costs in the home market. 
There are a number of reasons to suspect the moral argument 
that countries are buying guns rather than food, death 
rather than life. 
One of the most comprehensive studies of the effects of 
arms spending was carried out by Benoit in 1973. Perhaps 
contrary to expectation, he found that the level of 
military spending was positively associated with 
non-military growth rates. 
. Why this should be seems to be explained in two very 
different ways. 
The first is to see no direct causal relationship. It may 
be that the growth in military spending and high 
measured growth in non-military GNP are produced by 
other influences, such as the tendency of the major 
powers to pump economic development assistance as well 
as military aid into countries in which they have 
strategic interests. Equally, it is often argued that 
resources for armaments are diverted from social 
welfare spending rather than away from productive 
investment. 
The second explanation is to see a causal 
relationship, with the existence of an army 
contributing positively to economic .growth.. L,ucien Pye 
:and Morris.Janowitz are both supporters of this * po,int i . 
of view. US military assistance policies were ’ . 
influenced considerably by Pye’s article on ‘Armies in 
the process of political modernisation. He argues 
:hat the army is the most likely institution to induce 
modernising attitudes, and encourage foreign aid. 
In the colonial attempts to create modern 
institutions, military organisations were the most 
successful by far. He says: 
..a military establishment comes as close as any 
human organisation can to the ideal type for an 
industrialised and secularised enterprise. 
In other words, a developing country imports not 
simply arms, but the concept of a developed army. As a 
historical pattern, the link between military 
professionalism and the absorbtion of external 
technology is extremely powerful. The army provides a 
training in citizenship, and can contribute to: 
responsible nationalism. Indeed the recruit may 
be impressed that he must make sacrifices to 
achieve the goals of nationalism and that the 
process of nation building involves more than 
just the shouting of slogans. 
Pye also believes that acculturation to modern life is 
more successful in the army than elsewhere. Partly 
this is because it is the most modern institution in 
the country , and also because army life is more secure 
than in the civilian sector. 
He further argues that military leaders are 
emotionally more secure, and find it easier both to 
recognise that the West is strong and that their 
country is weak, and to accept foreign aid. 
Since these leaders seem to have less need to 
avoid realities, they are in fact easier people 
with whom to deal and to carry on straightforward 
relations. 
Janowitz adds that since social recruitment to the 
army is middle or lower middle class, 
the military profession does not have strong 
. allegiance to an .integrated upper class which it - 
. . ‘. . . accepts ‘.as 
pervasive 
political leader nor does’it have a ’ : . . 
conservative outlook. . :. (Military 
officers) . ..develop a sense of public service and 
national guardianship as a result of their 
military training and exp$rience. Their politics 
is the politics of the suprapolitical’ because 
they are suspicious of professional politicians 
and the bargaining process. 
I believe that both explanations of the link between 
military and non-military GNP growth can contribute 
understanding to the situation, That is to say that 
within a country an army can act as a catalyst for 
positive ‘industrial and social development, and that 
it can also give a developing country some links and 
some credibility in its dealings with the developed 
world. 
The existence within a country of an army gives that 
country the means to ensure its own security 
internally, and to deter any external threat. 
That abuses of military power are possible are 
undoubtably true, but human rights violations stem 
much more from the nature of the individuals than from 
the state of military technology available. The 
modernising of a countries infrastructure, and of its 
political social and legal systems, (often the 
concommitent of military expansion), seems to provide 
the best longterm safeguard. 
That is not to say that there are no abuses of this 
process. In ‘The Arms Bazaar’ Anthony Sampson 
highlights many of the abuses which have occured. 
CONCLUSION 
It would be unjustifiably smug to draw 
conclusion, as it 
any safe 
is not a black and white issue in 
anything except the colour of the main actors. The 
problems of the third world cannot be ignored, but 
neither can they be solved by some 
transformation of spears into pruning hooks. 
magical 
From an abstract moral standpoint it is regrettable 
that progress in developing countries is being brought 
about by a trade in weapons of destruction. As these 
countries expand their productive capacity then they 
too will manufacture arms of increasing sophistication 
in. increasing quantities. . * . . 
.,’ * . * Regrettable’; but at t’he * present sta& of z human’ 
development probably inevitable. The quote from an MBA 
student at the start of this paper highlights the 
difficulty of establishing trust between two small 
groups of intelligent people who have grown up largely 
in the same culture and where very little of any 
consequence is at stake. 
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THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONTRIBUTION OF 
TOBACCO LEAF CULTIVATION TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
BY 
JACK PICTON 

TOBACCO LEAP CULTIVATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
A INTRODUCTION 
This paper outlines the contribution that tobacco leaf 
cultivation makes to the economic and social development of 
the Third World. 
Two particular examples, Malaysia and Zimbabwe, will be 
used to highlight the effects of purely domestic-oriented. . . 
and largely export-oriented cultivation, respectively. 
No attempt will be made to accommodate the fashionable 
anit-smoking trend in the world's "WASP" countries although 
regrettably the ill-informed emotionalism that this 
engenders has crowded out the acceptance of the beneficial 
effects of tobacco cultivation to the Third World that a 
rational approach would demonstrate. 
B BACKGROUND 
Tobacco has had firm friends and bitter enemies ever since 
North American colonists transplanted the crop from the 
Caribbean and South America thus launching its importance 
in international trade. 
Tobacco is a commodity in which most developing countries 
can find immediate tangible social and economic benefits. 
Its growing generates employment for largely rural 
populations and it provides a ready source of cash for 
small-holders who would otherwise have to rely on subsis- 
tence farming or on less remunerative crops. Tobacco 
leaf is an important foreign exchange earner for developing 
countries as well as creating extensive employment oppor- 
tunities, particularly in countries where manual methods of 
production are the most common. 
In nearly every producing country, tobacco is one of the 
most valuable crops grown and its contribution to total 
agricultural income is almost invariably significant, 
reaching 25 per cent in Zimbabwe. Tobacco is also one of 
the most remunerative cash crops yielding net returns per 
. unit of land which may be several times higher than those 
from other'industrial crops or St&e foodstuffs. ' 
C THE GLOBAL PICTURE 
1 Economic Aspects 
A number of features of the world tobacco economy make 
it unique among markets for agricultural commodities. 
Firstly, the smoking of tobacco is attended by a number 
of alleged health hazards, yet cigarette consumption 
continues to rise and the consumption of tobacco leaf 
has only recently begun to level off. 
Secondly, the production, trade and consumption of 
tobacco are subject to government regulation in nearly 
all countries. The measures include control of planting, 
production quotas, guaranteed prices, incentive payments 
and subsidies, export and import duties, and state 
trading in tobacco. 
Thirdly, the undoubted economic and social benefits 
accruing to those engaged in the cultivation of tobacco 
must be weighed against the social and economic costs 
n 
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deriving from the health risks in the form of 
additional health care facilities, increased social 
security payments and lower productivity among the 
working population; these are the chief concerns 
of the developed world. 
i) Agriculture 
Tobacco is probably the most widely grown among 
the non-food crops, being produced in about . 
120 countries, yet it only occupies OI'3 per cent ' ' 
of the world's arable land compared to 0.7 per 
cent for coffee and 2 per cent for cotton (see 
Figure I). Tobacco is frequently grown in rota- 
tion with crops such as wheat, maize, rice and 
groundnuts. Where tobacco is grown on the same 
land year after year as in Turkey, Malawi and 
Zimbabwe, the soil is generally unsuitable for 
most other crops. 
ii) Employment 
Tobacco is an important source of employment 
and cash income in all the countries where it is 
grown. In developing countries, 
production tends to be concentrated on very small 
holdings and the crop provides a livelihood not 
only for the growers but also for large numbers 
of family members and other workers. 
In Malawi 100,000 families rely on the cash 
income from tobacco and in Tanzania tobacco leaf 
generates income for 370,000 people or 2 per 
cent of the population. In the Indian state of 
Andhra Pradesh, tobacco provides a living 
for 75,000 farmers and 2-million other workers 
engaged in curing, packing and processing. 
To protect the farmers and ancillary workers 
most developing countries operate price support 
systems, as well as quotas and technical assis- 
tance to maintain quality. 
iii) Contribution to Agricultural Incomes .,, 
. . . 
The government intervention policie's affect 
the level of cash incomes received by tobacco 
growers inasmuch as they determine the volume 
produced and occasionally raise prices, but 
the varieties grown and the quality of leaf 
harvested also have considerable influence on 
aggregate cash receipts. 
Even in countries where aggregate cash receipts 
from tobacco are relatively small, their contri- 
bution to total agricultural incomes can be 
considerable, For example, tobacco brings in 
almost a quarter of total agricultural income in 
Zimbabwe where it earns twice as much cash as 
sugar, five times as much as cotton and ten 
times as much as maize. In Malawi receipts from 
tobacco represent 8 per cent of the total cash 
income of farmers; they are three times higher 
than those from sugar, and ten times higher 
than those from groundnuts. 
Traditional methods of production employing only 
human labour, and using few agricultural inputs 
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beyond essential implements are the rule in most 
developing countries. This inevitably affects 
average yields which are much lower than USA, 
Canada and Japan for example where machinery use 
is widespread. 
Nevertheless tobacco compares very favourably 
with other crops even in those countries where it 
yields a relatively low income per unit of land. 
Thus in,Brazil., the..only commodities providing : . 
gross cash receipts per hectare comparable with 
those from tobacco are fruits and broiler chickens 
for which markets are limited. In India gross 
returns from tobacco average 8,200 rupees per 
hectare compared with 2,500 for cotton and ground- 
nuts; and 1,350 rupees for the staple food crops, 
jowar and ragi (see 6'Jupe z). 
In Zimbabwe farmers receive US $2,000 per hectare 
for flue-cured tobacco but only US $130 for maize. 
iv) Investment Costs 
Whatever the technology used, the cultivation of 
tobacco requires the application of fertilizer 
and the installation of curing equipment. Conse- 
quently the costs of production tend to be much 
higher than in the case of food crops, particularly 
staple foodstuffs. Nevertheless net returns from 
tobacco frequently exceed gross receipts from 
other cash crops grown in the same area. In India 
and Zimbabwe net returns from tobacco exceed 
press returns for all other crops. 
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The differentials in net returns per unit of 
land, which suggests that tobacco is invariably 
among the most profitable crops grown in a 
country are only partly due to restrictions on 
tobacco growing and price support mechanisms. 
The principal reason lies in the special combina- 
tion of climatic and soil conditions required 
by the tobacco plant and as this occurs only in 
limited areas, it effectively prevents indis- 
c *. . 
criminate expansion of cultivation. .. . . 
v) Export Earnings 
The trend towards blended cigarettes in developed 
countries has created a growing import demand for 
qriental, burley and low-cost flue-cured leaf, 
mainly the preserve of the developing countries. 
This has stimulated their exports and their share 
of the international trade in leaf, by volume, 
has risen from 48 per cent in the late-Sixties to 
53 per cent in the early-Eighties. 
However, due to the predominance of low-cost, low 
quality tobacco in developing countries exports 
aggregate foreign exchange earnings averaged US 
$1,6OOM in the early-Eighties compared to US 
$2,400 for the developed countries. Nevertheless 
exports of tobacco play an important part in the 
agricultural economics of many developing countries 
which depend on them for a significant proportion 
of total foreign exchange earnings. Tobacco is 
the leading export commodity in Malawi and Zimbabwe 
where it accounts for one-third and one-quarter of 
-60 
agricultural export earnings respectively. For 
India the figure is 7 per cent, and Brazil 4 per 
cent. 
The economic benefits of tobacco cultivation are 
wide-ranging and almost entirely beneficial. The 
picture with regard to the social development is 
not quite so clear. 
2. Social Aspects . 
Social Status 
For farmers, tobacco growing demands hard work, 
discipline and organisation to be successful. 
Competent farmers find it not only financially 
rewarding but they can also profitably apply their 
tobacco growing and management skills to other 
farm activities. Involvement with tobacco has 
invariably broadened farmers' horizons, enhancing 
awareness and self-respect and furthering social 
developments of the community (see section on 
Malaysia). 
The most fundamental consequences of leaf tobacco 
growing stem from the evolving status of the 
farmer. Despite the often limited scale of his 
operations the tobacco farmer of the Third World 
is emerging as a small-scale entrepreneur and as 
a skilled agriculturalist. In many regions the 
tobacco grower ranks amongst the elite of his 
local community, with the more ambitious being 
persons of considerable social standing. A good 
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tobacco farmer is a highly skilled cultivator 
with a knowledge and understanding of the charac- 
teristics and requirements of the soil, of the 
seeds and seedlings he is planting, of the purposes 
of the chemicals he is applying and of the need 
for correct practices. His yields and quality of 
other crops may well benefit from this discipline. 
ii) Social Development 
t . . 
. The degree of social development varies according 1' . 
to the level of income derived from tobacco and 
the length of time tobacco has been established. 
In the newer areas it is an income effect allowing 
families to buy goods from local traders or 
to employ and pay hired labour. In more developed 
areas, such as Santa Cruz in Brazil, ancillary 
industrial processes have been established, promp- 
ting the multiplier effect for further activities 
such as hotels, banks, legal and other professional 
services. An important development has been the 
emergence of engineering firms specialising in 
the design and fabrication of tobacco processing 
equipment. In this they have benefitted from the 
high cost of imported equipment that has forced 
the local companies to patronise local suppliers. 
D POLEMICS 
i) Food Crop Substitution 
It is often claimed that tobacco leaf cultivation 
excludes the growth of staple food crops. There 
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appears to be no evidence to support this claim 
in any of the world's tobacco growing areas. 
Widespread state intervention ensures that there 
is little uncontrolled growing of tobacco. 
., . 
c 
The extent to which tobacco competes with food 
crops for land, labour and capital depends upon 
the inter-relationships between environmental and 
agronomic conditions, possible rotation patterns 
and the reiative competitiveness .of alternative 
crops'. However, the higher standards of farming 
in tobacco areas generally assure higher yields 
of food crops than national averages (see section 
on Zimbabwe). 
ii) Ecological CAestions 
Most developing countries have faced a severe 
crisis, until recently, over energy costs. The 
problem of paying for oil imports with scarce 
foreign exchange plays a part in government policy 
towards tobacco, particularly the curing process. 
The deforestation which is occurring to provide wood 
fuel for curing barns produces a further anxiety, 
with serious ecological overtones unless a re- 
planting programme can be effectively implemented. 
The growing awareness of this problem has promted 
or required farmers to grow suitable fast-growing 
trees and to seek alternative, cost effective 
sources of fuel. Nevertheless in comparison to 
the ravages of "slash and burn" agriculture and 
domestic cooking requirements, the tobacco related 
deforestation is minor. 
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iii) Financial Burdens 
. 
Raising sufficient funds and security in order 
to provide the necessary self-financing portion, 
as well as to secure bank loans for the balance of 
the total financial requirements, is a major under- 
taking for farmers and represents the most burden- 
some aspect of tobacco farming. In particular, 
the financing of barn construction involves a major 
investment and commitment on the 6art of the farmer. . . . 
Most banks' medium-term loans have a repayment 
period of five years but for small-holders with a 
normally short-term perspective based on cash in 
the pocket within the season, five years is a very 
long time horizon. The medium-term loan requires 
farmers to be more discipLined in their traditional 
attitudes to money. 
E MALAYSIA - A CASE OF IMPORT SUBSTITUTION 
Malaysia is a recent entrant to the international fraternity 
of tobacco growers, and her initial aim was to promote import 
substitution and for the manufacturers to by-pass increasingly 
severe import duties. The state of Kelantan accounts for 
over 70 per cent of Malaysian leaf cultivation. Just over 
8,000 hectares are planted with individual plots ranging from 
0.25 to 2 hectares. A key aspect of the overall agricultural 
situation in Kelantan is serious pressure on the land, 
particularly on the coastal belt, brought about by general 
population growth and by the fragmentation of holdings due to 
Islamic inheritance customs. One consequence of this pressure 
is that about 20 per cent of the land used for tobacco is 
either totally unsuitable, being saline or flood-prone, or of 
marginal value. 
This has served to depress average tobacco yields and 
quality in Kelantan despite attempts by the authorities to 
control the pattern and growth of leaf production. 
The prime reason for this undesirable increase in tobacco 
growing in unsuitable areas is that, even with low yields 
and poor quality, the financial returns from tobacco repre- 
sent a guaranteed and substantial source of cash income for 
otherwise subsistence farmers. In comparison with the other 
main crops grown in the. region, chiefly rice, tobacco is by 
far the'most attractive to the individual farmer. Official 
studies indicate that returns from tobacco/rice cropping 
compared to rice/rice cropping are two and a half times 
greater. Yet even the more profitable rotation keeps the 
Kelantan farmer below the official poverty line: without 
tobacco the situation would be far worse for the main' 
poverty groups - paddy farmers, fishermen, cocunut farmers 
and rubber small-holders - most of whom grow some tobacco. 
Government policy however is that further expansion must 
be on the basis of production by small-holders and that 
they should undertake the curing of the leaf also so that 
the farmers will recognise the inter-relationship between 
the quality of green leaf, cured leaf and income. From this 
it is hoped that yield, quality and productivity will rise. 
F ZIMBABWE: FOREIGN EXCMNGE EARNER 
The tobacco industry of Zimbabwe is a sophisticated agro- 
industrial complex closely integrated in the country's 
diverse economy. Historically, tobacco was the only crop 
able to carry the cost of land clearance and initial cul- 
tivation. The industry directly supports 8 per cent of 
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the national labour force and the infrastructure that has 
grown up to serve the industry forms the basis for agricul- 
tural commodity processing and marketing. 
Zimbabwe is primarily an agricultural exporting country 
and there has been a close relationship between the growth in 
tobacco exports and in GDP. In 1985 tobacco represented 
54 per cent of agricultural exports and was worth US $230M. 
Agriculture employs 26 per cent of the national iabour . 
'force,and tobacco .is. the largest singie, employer:in this . 
group, providing a livelihood for 600,000 people. On the 
back of tobacco's success, the agricultural economy has 
diversified into cotton, wheat, soya beans and coffee, over 
and above basic foodstuffs. Zimbabwe is largely self- 
sufficient in food, unlike much of East and Central Africa, 
and has surpluses generating foreign exchange needed for 
development. The Zimbabwean tobacco farmers produce 35 per 
cent of the nation's maize, 30 per cent of the groundnuts, 
21 per cent of the beef and 17 per cent of winter wheat. 
There is a particularly strong association between tobacco 
and the staple food, maize. 
Tobacco exports contribute 15% of gross foreign exchange 
and up to 25% of gross national earnings. There is also a 
rapidly growing export trade in related items such as 
farm machinery, irrigation equipment and seeds. The asso- 
ciated support infrastructure of marketing, research, 
extension and supply have enabled the country to capitalise 
on its significant comparative advantage in export crop 
production, unlike many African nations which have taxed 
their agricultural sectors excessively to generate urban 
employment. 
Zimbabwe has large tracts of shallow, fragile soils of 
low fertility which are very suitable for tobacco and not 
much else. Thus it does not compete with food crops for 
soil or other resources. It is the exports of tobacco that 
generate the foreign exchange necessary for imports of fuel, 
fertiliser and capital machinery. Without the export 
earnings of tobacco, Zimbabwe's ability to feed itself would 
be compromised as maize, the national staple, consumes 
60 per cent of all fertilizers sold, most of which is 
imported." Since fertilizer imports can be expected to'grow 
as agricultural production expands, 
. 
the need to maintain 
export earnings from tobacco is self-evident. It is fair 
to say that Zimbabwe has evolved an efficient, labour- 
intensive tobacco industry well suited to the needs of a 
developing country. 
G CONCLUSION 
What would be lost if tobacco growing and export were 
entirely removed from the Third World economy? This question 
helps to concentrate one's view on the crop's contribution 
to the developing world. 
For farmers who have mastered the disciplines of tobacco 
growing, the psychological and economic impact would be 
considerable. While cultivation demands long hours, hard 
work and considerable investment, tobacco is a profitable 
crop and one which provides a stable source of income in 
comparison with most other cash and food crops. The cash 
surplus generated enables the farmer to raise his standard 
of living by the purchase of additional land and essential 
and modest luxury items. Farmers also are able to 
alleviate their other debt burdens and to pay for their 
children's education. 
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The acquired tobacco growing skills can be applied to 
other crops. The necessity of undertaking loans to finance 
tobacco operations exposes the farmer to the disciplined 
requirements of money management. For all these reasons 
tobacco farmers tend to have a greater degree of awareness 
and self-respect and higher social status in the community 
than other farmers. Consequently there is a greater likeli- 
hood that such farmers will remain on the land and continue 
to contribute to rural and national societies and economics, 
as the 'example. of Malaysia and Zimbabke show.. Not only 
. 
has tobacco growing generally had a positive impact on food 
production, tobacco related incomes can stimulate, directly 
and indirectly, the establishment and development of other 
manufacturing activities and services. This multiple effect 
is an important contributor to both regional and overall 
economic and social development. Most of this would be 
lost in the unlikely event of tobacco growing being 
discontinued. 
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